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Abstract
Better health not only boosts longevity in itself, it also postpones the initial
onset of disability and chronic inﬁrmity to a later age. In this paper we ex-
amine the potential eﬀects of such `compression of morbidity' on pensions, and
introduce a health-dependent dimension to the standard pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension scheme. Studying the long-term implications of such a system in a sim-
ple overlapping generations framework, we ﬁnd that an increase in public health
investment can augment capital accumulation in the long run. Because of this,
the combination of health investment with a partially health-dependent PAYG
scheme may in fact outperform a purely PAYG system in terms of lifetime
welfare.
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1 Introduction
Health care improvements have multiple eﬀects on an increasingly ageing population,
not in the least when it comes to disability incidence. Indeed, having lived a healthier
life, we improve our chances on postponing the inevitable slide towards disability and
eventual loss of autonomy. In this paper we study this evolution, and whether it can
be harnessed to design more eﬀective pension schemes.
Whereas the ongoing debate on pension systems tends to center on health im-
provements as a cause of unsustainable pension beneﬁts, our take here will be entirely
diﬀerent. True enough, healthier people will live longer, which together with decreas-
ing fertility rates mounts the pressure on the sort of `pay-as-you-go' (PAYG) systems
in place in most OECD countries.1 Yet as we will show in our model, better health
needn't always be a hurdle. By structurally rethinking the design of PAYG systems,
health improvements can in fact take the heat oﬀ increasingly unsustainable pension
liabilities, whilst adding to overall welfare at the same time.
The reason is simple, and due to what is known as compression of morbidity
in medical terms. A healthier lifestyle nudges up the age at which initial disabil-
ity or chronic inﬁrmity sets in, outpacing any gains in longevity which also follow
from improved health. This results in fewer years of disability across the board,
as loss of autonomy is `compressed' into an ever smaller time frame.2 In other
words, propped up public health investment dampens disability incidence more than
it boosts longevity. If pensions were then to a larger extent conditional on health,
by means of e.g. disability pensions or long-term care beneﬁts, pensions could wind
down even as longevity continues to rise. What is more, forward looking agents will
align their saving decisions with this brand new pension arrangement, which could
shore up capital accumulation and long-term economic growth.
To examine these dynamics, we set up a general equilibrium model where individ-
ual health and pension beneﬁts are interlinked across time. We use a standard PAYG
extension to the textbook overlapping generations (OLG) model introduced by Di-
amond (1965), and allow for two kinds of pension entitlements. A proportionally
universal pension - similar to any PAYG scheme - and a conditional `disability' pen-
sion which depends on individual health. The healthier the older generation in other
words, the less pension beneﬁts they will receive and vice versa. Crucially, whether
the retired turn out healthier than their predecessors is endogenously determined by
public health investment over earlier stages of life.
1The reason is that for each beneﬁciary pensioner there are fewer working contributors, a down-
ward trend which is projected to accelerate (Pecchenino and Pollard, 2005; Cigno, 2007). See also
United Nations (1998) or Cigno and Werding (2007) on increasing age-dependency ratios.
2Fries (1989) was ﬁrst to coin the term, with many empirical follow-ups providing evidence. See
e.g. Vita et al. (1998), Doblhammer and Kytir (2001), Hubert et al. (2002), or Fries et al. (2011).
Faria (2015) concludes that compression of morbidity `should be upgraded from a hypothesis to a
theory', given the amount of evidence at hand.
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Our main theoretical contributions are twofold. First, we ﬁnd that an increase in
public health investment can brace capital accumulation in the long run. Once the
downwards eﬀect of health improvements on pensions is brought into play, younger
generations act on the stronger incentive to save so that capital levels rise alongside
health investment. Up to a certain level of taxation, this second-round eﬀect of
health investment always oﬀsets distortions caused by the tax hike ﬁnancing the
investment. Second, and because of this eﬀect, combining health investment with a
partially health-dependent PAYG pension scheme is shown to outperform a purely
PAYG system. This in lifetime utility terms and at identical levels of tax burden.
Now, in a world where the importance of long-term care assistance3 has grown to-
gether with the number of dependent elderly, our results oﬀer some relief.4 Although
highly stylised, our model indeed captures the main elements of most long-term care
arrangements currently in place. First, because of shifting family patterns and a
failing private market, the brunt of elderly care has come to lie with the public sec-
tor.5 Second, long-term care beneﬁts are assigned on a conditional basis, usually
by means of disability scales identifying various levels of dependency (e.g. the Katz
scale). Third, most of the formal long-term care assistance of this kind is ﬁnanced
on a PAYG basis.
Moreover, since public expenditures on long-term care are projected to rise sub-
stantially in the future,6 the lever of public health investment described in our model
will bite all the more. Unlike a simple increase in pension contributions, beeﬁng up
public health investment in a budget neutral way could then keep pensions sustain-
able whilst improving overall welfare.
2 Background
This paper bridges two strands of literature on inter-generational concerns, both hing-
ing on the stylised overlapping generations (OLG) framework pioneered by Diamond
(1965).
Firstly, parsimonious OLGmodeling has often been used to study the eﬀectiveness
of PAYG pensions. Indeed, changes in fertility rates and life expectancy over the
last decades have fueled this debate, and are well suited to a simple overlapping
generations setup. To this end, Diamond's model has been extended in various
3This kind of elderly care care can be administered both at home and in various kinds of insti-
tutions, including nursing homes and long-stay hospitals (Cremer et al., 2012).
4More than two out of ﬁve people aged 65 or older report having some sort of functional limitation
which range from sensory, physical, mental, or self-care disabilities, to diﬃculties leaving home (see
Pestieau and Ponthière (2010)).
5See e.g. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) on the insurance puzzle in the long term care private
insurance market, or Pestieau and Sato (2008) on the case for public nursing PLUS.
6Cremer et al. (2012) predict a 115% rise in expenditures in the EU27 over the next 40 years.
A lower bound estimate they emphasise, since future changes in the number of people receiving
informal or no care are expected to deteriorate, yet assumed constant in their analysis.
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directions to capture the (simultaneous) eﬀects of increasing longevity and curtailed
fertility on pension systems.7
Second, public health investment and its long-term implications have also been
sized up from a stylised OLG perspective. Chakraborty (2004) for one, adapts the
model of Diamond (1965) so that longevity endogenously depends on public health
investment. Raising taxes to ﬁnance public health investments then improves survival
probabilities of the elderly. Anticipating this longer lifespan, agents save more to
uphold consumption at an older age, thereby boosting capital accumulation in the
long run. Health investment thus turns out to stimulate growth and development.
Fanti and Gori (2011a) arrive at the opposite outcome, by endogenising old-age
productivity rather than longevity. Logically, agents will save less for old-age if they
can still earn a decent living at that point.
In our model, neither old-age productivity nor life expectancy are endogenously
linked to public health investment. Rather, it's the quality of life during old age
which will depend positively on public health investment.8 Given any stretch of
old age, to what extent does reduced disability or chronic inﬁrmity impact pension
systems? To answer this question, and taking our cue from the various `long-term
care' arrangements in place in OECD countries, pensions in our model take health
status during old age into account.9 As such, and since health-dependent beneﬁts of
this kind are usually ﬁnanced on a `pay as you go' (PAYG) basis, our design can be
seen as a `long-term care' augmented version of the purely unfunded pension schemes
modelled in the literature.
All in all, we are ﬁrst to consider the relationship between partially health depen-
dent pension systems and public investment in health. Shedding some light on the
long-term implications of combining extended health care with conditional pensions,
we cover several blind spots in the policy debate as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the
model, and establishes equilibrium. Section 4 delves into the eﬀect of a rise in health
taxation on steady-state capital accumulation. Section 5 combines all of our ﬁndings
to shed light on the potential welfare ramiﬁcations brought about by the kind of
mixed pension system we propose. Section 6 concludes.
7See e.g. De La Croix and Michel (2002), Fanti and Gori (2010), Pestieau and Ponthière (2012),
Fanti and Gori (2012), Fanti and Gori (2014), Cipriani (2014).
8Our focus then serves as a logical counterpart to other approaches where longevity was endoge-
nously modelled, but health status during old-age kept constant. See e.g. Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Chakraborty (2004), Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), De La Croix and Ponthiere (2010),
Jouvet et al. (2010), De La Croix et al. (2012), De La Croix and Licandro (2013), De La Croix and
Licandro (2013), and Fanti and Gori (2014).
9See Norton (2000) or Cremer et al. (2012) for an overview of the (cross-country) variety in
long-term care programs.
3
3 The Model
We consider a closed economy, populated by perfectly foresighted and identical in-
dividuals whose ﬁnite lifespan is divided up into two generations: youth (working
period), and old age (retirement period). During each time period t the newly born
generation of Nt individuals overlaps with the previous one, growing at an exogenous
rate of n ∈ (−1; +∞), where Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1. When young, agents have one unit
of labor at their disposal which they supply to ﬁrms earning the competitive wage
rate wt. As soon as they retire, agents get by on accumulated savings as well as on
pension beneﬁts provided by the government.
Now, what sets our model apart is the introduction of a social security dimension
consisting both of pension and health care elements, catering to a wider array of
elderly needs and general medical risks. To ﬁnance this social security system, the
government looks to the working generation. It levies a health tax τh on gross labour
incomes, and takes out a social security contribution rate τp. Health tax revenues
are marked out for public investments in the health of working generations,10 whilst
the social security contributions are used to ﬁnance the pensions and public services
of the elderly.
3.1 Public health investment
As set out in our introduction, health status during old age is to a large extent related
to the degree of public health investment in earlier periods of life. Introducing these
dynamics to our model, old-age health status dt+1 at time t + 1 will depend on the
level of public investment in health ht at time t. Following Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), we specify this relationship as follows:
dt+1 =
d0 + d1∆h
δ
t
1 + ∆hδt
(1)
Like Chakraborty (2004), we focus on the simpliﬁed case where δ = 1, ∆ = 1,
d0 = 0 and 0 < d1 ≤ 1.11 As a result, the health status function is given by the non-
decreasing, concave function: dt+1 =
d1ht
1+ht
, satisfying the following properties: d[0] =
0, limh→∞d[h] = d1 and limh→0d
′
[h] = d1. Assuming positive health investment,
ht > 0, old-age health status will fall between dt+1 ∈ [0, 1].
10Such investments can range from building hospitals, setting up new vaccination programmes
or prevention campaigns, bankrolling scientiﬁc research projects, or quite simply extending existing
medical services. See e.g. Chakraborty (2004) or Fanti and Gori (2014) for a similar approach.
11We set d0, the minimum health level when old, equal to zero to allow for the realistic situation
of complete non-self-suﬃciency during old age. Exogenous medical progress (due to e.g. scientiﬁc
research) is denoted by d1, and as such captures the eﬃciency of public health investments on
old-age health status. Parameters δ and ∆ lastly, further deﬁne the eﬀectiveness of public health
investment. Notice that setting both ∆ = δ = 1 implies a tractable monotonic and concave function.
By contrast, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), study an S-shaped function, with δ > 1.
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Public health investments ht at time t are ﬁnanced through an exogenous tax
τh on the labour incomes of young workers at time t. For the sake of simplicity we
assume a constant proportional tax on gross wages, so that ht = g[τhwt] = τhwt.
12
The higher public health expenditures in other words, the higher health investments.
3.2 Health-dependent pensions and social security
The novelty of our model lies in the design of the pension system. The higher the
loss of autonomy or degree of morbidity, the higher the old-age beneﬁts, and vice-
versa. We assume that total pension beneﬁts at time t comprise a standard universal
PAYG beneﬁt put as well as a disability beneﬁt p
d
t . While the former is independent
from health status and universally attributed, the latter directly depends on health
conditions dt of the retired. The per pensioner beneﬁt then reads as follows:
pt = ρp
u
t + (1− ρ)pdt [δ(dt, τp)] (2)
Where 0 < ρ < 1 deﬁnes the share of social security contributions τpwt(1+n) directed
to universal pensions put , as opposed to revenues earmarked for other social security
programs such as the disability pension pdt , set by (1− ρ). We can then re-formulate
(2) as:
pt =
Universal pension︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρτpwt(1 + n) +
Disability pension︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− ρ)τpwt(1 + n)δ[dt] (3)
Indeed, the standard PAYG system would be a particular case of our model where
ρ = 1. Zooming in on the disability pension in (3) moreover, the relation δ[dt] is
vital. As a downwards function of health through dt, the health-dependent feature of
our pension scheme emerges here: when health improves expenditures on disability
beneﬁts decrease, starting from the initial level of τpwt(1 + n). We assume this
function is inversely related to the health status of elderly at time t, such that:
δ[dt] = (1 − dt). Therefore, and through dt[ht−1], per pensioner beneﬁts in time
period t are endogenously determined by public health investments in the previous
period ht−1 as follows:
pt =
Universal pension︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρτpwt(1 + n) +
Disability pension︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− ρ)τpwtτp(1 + n)(1− dt[ht−1]) (4)
Lastly, when health improves and disability pensions begin to fall, the government
will have increasingly more funds at its disposal to spend at will. These excess
funds (1− ρ)wtτpdt(1 + n) are deﬁned as gt[dt], and fully re-invested to compensate
the elderly for incurred disposable income losses because of lower disability beneﬁts.
This could then range from spending on infrastructure (retirement homes, leisure
12Chakraborty (2004); Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007); Fanti and Gori (2011a, 2012) and Fanti
and Gori (2014) use the exact same simplifying assumption.
5
centers geared towards the elderly,..), or non-cash beneﬁts such as free access to
public transport or university classes.13 Summing up, the per pensioner budget
constraint faced by the government in period t is then given by:
pt[dt] + gt[dt] = τpwt(1 + n) (5)
3.3 Individuals
The expected lifetime utility of perfectly foresighted individuals of generation t is ex-
pressed by a homothetic and separable utility function Ut, deﬁned over consumption
and public investment:14
Ut = ln[c1,t] + β(ln[c2,t+1] + v[gt+1[dt+1]]) (6)
where c1,t denotes consumption at a young age, c2,t+1 consumption when retired,
and gt+1[dt+1] utility received from public investment in the elderly. For reasons
of simplicity, we assume sub-utility v[.] to be linear so that v[gt+1[dt+1]] = (1 −
ρ)wt+1τpdt+1.
15
Young individuals join the workforce and oﬀer their only unit of labour to ﬁrms,
receiving a competitive wage wt per unit of labour. This salary is taxed at time t to
ﬁnance both health and social security system expenditures. Therefore, the budget
constraint of the young agent at time t is given by:
c1,t + st = wt(1− τh − τp); (7)
Consequently, net income at a young age is used for consumption c1,t and saving
st, with the overall tax rate at (τp + τh) ∈ [0, 1]. Savings are deposited in a mutual
fund accruing at a gross expected return of ret+1. When old secondly, consumption
is ﬁnanced out of savings and expected social security. The budget constraint of an
old agent born at time t then reads as:
c2,t+1 = st(1 + r
e
t+1) + p
e
t+1 (8)
With pet+1 the expected pension beneﬁt as deﬁned by (4). Substituting equations (4),
(7) and (8) into (6) and maximizing Ut w.r.t. savings st, the optimal saving decision
of an individual born in period t can easily shown to be:
st =
βwt(1 + r
e
t+1)(1− τh − τp)− (1 + n)wet+1[1− dt+1(1− ρ)]
(1 + β)(1 + ret+1)
(9)
13Of course, such budgetary savings could also be used to lower pension contributions or gov-
ernment debt. For reasons of tractability, and because gt doesn't aﬀect our main ﬁndings in what
follows, we omit this possibility here.
14We assign index 1 to the young households and index 2 to the old households.
15This is a non-restricting assumption. In fact, as long as sub-utility is positive, using convex or
concave functional forms would not change our results.
6
Since we're interested in the long-term implications of public health investment, the
role of the latter in partial equilibrium is illustrative. Deriving (9) with respect to
health taxation τh yields:
∂st
∂τh
=
(1 + n)wet+1
[
∂dt+1
∂τh
]
− βwt(1 + ret+1)
(1 + β)(1 + ret+1)
≷ 0 (10)
What matters in (10) is the numerator, weighing up two eﬀects on individual saving
behaviour:
(1 + n)wet+1
[
∂dt+1
∂τh
]
≷ βwt(1 + ret+1) (11)
On the right hand side of (11) we ﬁnd the usual income eﬀect which hollows out
savings. Indeed, a higher health tax logically reduces the amount of disposable
income available for consumption as well as savings. A second eﬀect runs counter to
the ﬁrst however, as captured by the left hand side of (11). Here, health taxation
nudges up health investment which leads to better health dt+1 at old-age. Since
this in turn pulls down future claims on the entitlement system, perfectly foresighted
individuals have an incentive to save and uphold old-age consumption. At play here
is a substitution eﬀect from young to old-age consumption.
Which of both eﬀects wins out in general equilibrium will depend on the steady
state wage and interest rate levels, and by consequence, on the capital stock. In the
following sections we introduce production of goods and services to close the model,
and derive precisely such general general equilibrium features.
3.4 Firms
Final goods are produced using a Cobb Douglas technology Yt = AK
α
t N
1−α
t , with
α ∈ (0, 1). A > 0 represents exogenous technology productivity or total factor
productivity. We deﬁne the production function in per capita terms y = f(kt) = Ak
α
t ,
with kt deﬁned as capital per unit of labor. Assuming capital fully depreciates at the
end of each period and the price of output is normalised to unity, perfect competition
in the goods market implies that both capital and labor are paid their respective
marginal product, that is wt = (1− α)Akαt and rt = αAkα−1t − 1. Given the initial
capital stock k0, competitive equilibria are characterized by a sequence of {kt} that
satisﬁes equations kt+1 =
stNt
Nt+1
.
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3.5 Equilibrium
Combining the savings condition deﬁned in (9) with (1), and after some algebraic
manipulation, we obtain the following capital accumulation rule for kt+1 =
stNt
Nt+1
:
kt+1 =
αkαt (1 + c1k
α
t τh)(1− τh − τp)βc1
(1 + n)(c2− c1kαt τh(α(c3− 1− β)− c3))
(12)
With c1 = (1−α)A, c2 = α(1+β)+τp(1−α) and c3 = τp(1−d1(1−ρ)). Steady states
of the above dynamic path of capital accumulation are deﬁned by kt+1 = kt = k¯
∗.
Since equation (12) is a ﬁrst order non-linear equation, we are not able to derive an
analytical formulation for the non-trivial steady states. We can however show that
the zero equilibrium of the system is unstable, and prove the existence and stability
of a non-trivial steady state k¯∗ > 0.
Proposition 1 The dynamic system described by equation (12) possesses two steady
states {0, k¯∗}. The positive steady state k¯∗ > 0 is the only stable steady state.
Proof See appendix 1.
4 Public health investment and capital accumula-
tion
Having established equilibrium, we can now focus on our main point of interest: the
long-term welfare implications of combining a health-dependent pension scheme with
health investment. In this light, deriving the eﬀect of a rise in health investments
on the steady-state level of capital is a necessary ﬁrst step. Capital accumulation
inﬂuences wages, interest rates, and thus inevitably deﬁnes long-term outcomes.
Indeed, such a comparative statics exercise is far from trivial as pointed out above,
and expressed by (9). Higher health investments imply higher health taxes, which
take an immediate bite out of disposable income, in turn discouraging savings and
eroding the capital stock. Yet the partial equilibrium eﬀect also works in the opposite
direction, as health conditions during old-age improve because of health investment,
which encourages saving. What we ﬁnd is that when health taxation remains below
a certain threshold level and the capital stock is high, the latter eﬀect wins out in
general equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If k¯∗ > k˜, with k˜ =
(
τp+α(1−τp+β)
A(α−1)2d1(1−τp)τp(1−ρ)
) 1
α
, then there exists a
positive threshold τ¯h ∈ (0, 1) such that an increase in τh has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the steady state level of capital k¯∗: positive when 0 < τh < τ¯h, negative otherwise. If
k¯∗ ≤ k˜ then an increase in τh always has a negative eﬀect on the steady state level
of capital k¯∗.
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Proof See Appendix 2.
When τh < τ¯h and k¯
∗ > k˜, the downwards pressure of health improvements on
pensions induces younger generations to save more, so that capital accumulation
rises. The resulting higher wages translate into even more health investment -ceteris
paribus with regard to the value of the health tax τh- which in turn improves health
conditions of the elderly. This sparks oﬀ an indirect general equilibrium feedback
eﬀect which encourages saving even more, and serves as a catalyst to accumulate
capital down the line. As a result, steady-state output per worker increases.16
However, this multiplier eﬀect is only triggered under certain conditions. If the
government sets a tax rate τh > τ¯h which is too distortive, investment in public
health impedes capital accumulation in the long run. A lower capital stock k¯∗ < k˜
also plays its part. To understand these conditions, we adjust expression (11) for
steady-state values and simplify:
(1 + n)
(
∂d[h]
∂τh
)
≷ β(1 + r) (13)
Now, since d[h] is concave in τh, higher values of τh will lessen the chances for the
substitution eﬀect on the left of (13) to outweigh the income eﬀect on the right. As
the sign ﬂips in the opposite direction when τh jumps over τ¯h, individuals start saving
less after a health tax hike. Indeed, health investment in this case only leads to minor
health gains, and very small reductions in future pensions. These are readily oﬀset by
the disposable income cuts, which remain the same on the margin. Similarly, lower
steady-state capital levels will also tilt expression (13) in favour of the right hand
side, since smaller capital stocks generate higher interest rates and lower wages.17
To illustrate how the steady state level of capital responds to an increase in the
health tax rate, we perform a very simple numerical analysis in Table 1. When
τh = 0, we get a steady state level of capital k¯
∗ = 2.4316, a threshold k˜ = 0.4058 and
a threshold τ¯h = 0.021. As the health tax rate edges up from 0 to this threshold of
2.1%, the steady state level of capital follows suit. For values of the tax rate larger
than this threshold, our model predicts a negative impact of increased public health
taxation on capital accumulation. As we can observe in Table 1, an increase of the
tax rate larger than 2.1% negatively impacts the capital stocks.
We used the following parameter values for this simulation. A capital-output
elasticity α = 0.4, in between common estimates for developed and developing coun-
tries at α = 0.33 and α = 0.5.18 A discount factor β = 0.2, as in Strulik (2004) and
Fanti and Gori (2011a). Pension contributions τpayg = 0.15, as a majority of OECD
16A similar multiplier eﬀect of health investment on growth can be found in Chakraborty (2004),
Fanti and Gori (2011b) or Fanti and Gori (2014).
17Keeping in mind that
∂d[h]
∂τh
=
(
w
1+τhw
+ τhw
2
(1+τhw)
2
)
and thus increasing in w.
18The same argument can be found in Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Fanti and Gori (2011a).
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Table 1: Numerical example: the eﬀect of a positive health shock
τh τ¯h k¯
∗ Eﬀect on S.S. Level of Capital
0% 0.021 2.4316
1% 0.021 2.4654 positive
1.5% 0.021 2.4727 positive
2% 0.021 2.4752 positive
2.5% 0.021 2.4738 negative
3% 0.021 2.4693 negative
3.5% 0.021 2.4621 negative
4% 0.021 2.4527 negative
countries have rates between 10% and 20%. An eﬃciency of health investment at
d1 = 0.95, as in Fanti and Gori (2014). An exogenous population growth rate of
n = 0.05, being the replacement rate in a single-parent model as in Fanti and Gori
(2014). In line with Chakraborty (2004), we set A = 25. The weight of the standard
pension is set at ρ = 0.25.19
5 Health, disability pensions, and welfare
Let us now look at the welfare eﬀects of health investment in a policy context where
pensions are partially health-dependent. More speciﬁcally, we're interested in max-
imizing steady state expected lifetime utility using both tax instruments τp and τh,
but keeping the total tax burden constant.20 Since in real life a purely PAYG system
can to a certain extent always be complemented with a health-dependent dimension
-and indeed in many cases already is as argued above- a budget-neutral, second-best
exercise of this nature seems justiﬁed. Not in the least because raising overall tax
levels is far from a feasible policy alternative to many of the debt stricken OECD
governments.
Our benevolent government will set an optimal policy pair (τh, τp) as a ﬁrst mover,
taking into account the decision making of all agents populating the economy. Con-
sidering the optimal savings decision in (9), the government therefore knows con-
sumption at a young age will be equal to:
c1,t =
(1 + ret+1)wt(1− τh − τp) + (1 + n)wet+1[1− dt+1(1− ρ)]
(1 + β)(1 + ret+1)
(14)
And similarly, that consumption at an older age will be:
19The value of these parameters do not alter the qualitative results of this paper. We choose these
values to have results in line with the relevant literature as well as the real world.
20Since even an A-Pareto improvement as deﬁned by Golosov (2007) is ruled out because of falling
interest rates in the period of reform, we limit ourselves to lifetime utility as a welfare measure.
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c2,t+1 =
βwt(1 + r
e
t+1)(1− τh − τp)− (1 + n)wet+1[1− dt+1(1− ρ)]
(1 + β)
+
(1 + β)[ρτpw
e
t+1 + (1− ρ)(τp(1− dt+1)wet+1)](1 + n)
(1 + β)
(15)
Lastly, public provision in the elderly generation follows:
gt+1[dt+1] = (1− ρ)wt+1τpdt+1(1 + n) (16)
The government can then maximize the following steady-state lifetime indirect utility
function V¯ [τp, τh], where x¯[.] is the steady state value of the generic variables x[.]
deﬁned above:
Max
τh
V¯ [τp, τh] = ln [c¯1[τp, τh]] + β(ln [c¯2[τp, τh]] + g¯[τp, τh]) (17)
Now, to assure budget neutrality, it suﬃces for the government to optimise with
respect to the health tax rate τh under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Deﬁne with w¯ and w¯payg the steady-state wage rate under a health-
dependent social security system and a purely PAYG pension scheme, respectively.
Given parameters, the contribution rate under a health-dependent social security sys-
tem is such that τˆp ≡ τp[τh, τpayg] = τpaygw¯paygw¯ − τh1+n .
This relation ensures that as health taxation τh rises, the contribution rate τˆp
decreases proportionally to keep tax revenues constant. To this end, we choose a
level of tax revenues accruing to a counterfactual PAYG system as our constant
benchmark, so that: τpaygw¯payg(1 + n) = τˆpw¯(1 + n) + τhw¯ at all times. Total
public expenditures p¯payg under this benchmark PAYG pension scheme will then
always be identical to those under our the health-dependent social security system,
p¯[d¯] + g¯[d¯] + h¯.
Now, our optimisation exercise will depend on the general equilibrium eﬀects
of marginally increasing health taxation, both on consumption as well as public
provision. These are summarised by the following total derivatives:
∂c¯1[.]
∂τh
=
−︷︸︸︷
∂c¯1
∂τh
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂c¯1
∂τˆp
−︷︸︸︷
∂τˆp
∂τh
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂c¯1
∂d¯
+︷︸︸︷
∂d¯
∂τh
+

+︷︸︸︷
∂c¯1
∂w¯
+︷︸︸︷
∂w¯
∂k¯∗
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂c¯1
∂r¯
−︷︸︸︷
∂r¯
∂k¯∗


?︷︸︸︷
∂k¯∗
∂τh
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂k¯∗
∂τˆp
−︷︸︸︷
∂τˆp
∂τh
 (18)
∂c¯2[.]
∂τh
=
−︷︸︸︷
∂c¯2
∂τh
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂c¯2
∂τˆp
−︷︸︸︷
∂τˆp
∂τh
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂c¯2
∂d¯
+︷︸︸︷
∂d¯
∂τh
+

+︷︸︸︷
∂c¯2
∂w¯
+︷︸︸︷
∂w¯
∂k¯∗
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂c¯2
∂r¯
−︷︸︸︷
∂r¯
∂k¯∗


?︷︸︸︷
∂k¯∗
∂τh
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂k¯∗
∂τˆp
−︷︸︸︷
∂τˆp
∂τh
 (19)
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∂g¯[.]
∂τh
=
+︷︸︸︷
∂g¯
∂d¯
+︷︸︸︷
∂d¯
∂τh
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂c¯2
∂w¯
+︷︸︸︷
∂w¯
∂k¯∗

?︷︸︸︷
∂k¯∗
∂τh
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂k¯∗
∂τˆp
−︷︸︸︷
∂τˆp
∂τh
 (20)
As equations (18) to (20) clearly demonstrate, the eﬀect of a budget-neutral rise
in health investment through increased health taxation is not altogether clear-cut. As
pointed out before, much depends on capital accumulation. But even when ∂k¯
∗
∂τh
> 0
under proposition 2, the outcome still crucially hinges on whether increasing wages
outweigh the direct impact of health taxation on consumption, both at a young and
an old age. Increasing capital levels also imply a smaller interest rate which may
stimulate consumption at the working age, but undercuts it when retired. The drop
in pension contribution rates keeping tax revenues constant lastly, brings about the
opposite.
Nonetheless, and more analytically put, the government's (second-best) objective
can be obtained by maximising:
V¯ = ln [w¯ (1− τˆp − τh)− s¯] + β(ln
[
(1 + r¯) s¯+
(
ρτˆpw¯ + (1− ρ)(1− d¯)τˆpw¯
)
(1 + n)
]
+ g¯[d¯])
(21)
Which yields the following result for any 0 < τˆp + τh < 1:
Result 1 (Second-best health policy) In an economy with a partially health-dependent
pension scheme, given assumption 2 and total public expenditures, a value of the
health tax τh, and therefore of contribution rate τˆp, exists that maximises steady-
state lifetime indirect utility.
Result 1 is illustrated in table 2. Using the same parameter values as in section 4, and
as observed in the ﬁrst row of table 2, the health tax rate maximising steady-state
indirect utility is given by τh = 0.055.
21 This implies a contribution rate for social
security of τˆp = 0.086. Crucially, driving these results is the exact same multiplier
eﬀect as described in section 4. Zooming in on the second row of table 1, rising health
tax rates indeed lead to higher capital levels compared to a purely PAYG system, and
this keeping total tax burden constant. Wages follow suit in the third row, pushing
up consumption in both periods of life in the second panel of the table, even though
pensions decrease in the third panel. Also, setting the weight of the universal pension
system to a more realistic value of ρ = 0.75 doesn't change matters. On the contrary,
as table 3 demonstrates, all results carry through with a health tax rate of τh = 0.081
maximising lifetime utility.
Now, since we've used a purely PAYG system as a benchmark to keep tax rev-
enues constant in our welfare exercise, tables 2 and 3 also answer a logical follow-up
21Since the level of τ¯p that allows constant total expenditure in the two social security system
depends on health taxation, the maximum admissible heath tax rate that guarantees a positive
contribution rate will be given by τh = 0.139.
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Table 2: Pure vs impure PAYG pension system: ρ = 0.25
Health Tax Rate τh
Variable payg τh = 1% τh = 5% τh = 5, 5% τh = 10% τh = 12.5%
U¯ 3.332 3.432 3.559 3.560 3.510 3.456
k¯∗ 2.432 2.584 2.939 2.968 3.172 3.260
w¯ 21.402 21.929 23.085 23.178 23.805 24.067
c¯1 15.639 15.995 16.735 16.790 17.150 17.289
c¯2 18.352 18.098 17.530 17.483 17.157 17.015
c¯1 + c¯2 33.991 34.093 34.265 34.273 34.307 34.304
d¯ N/A 0.171 0.509 0.532 0.669 0.713
τˆp 15% 13.69% 9.14% 8.61% 3.96% 1.43%
h¯ 0.000 0.219 1.155 1.275 2.380 3.008
p¯u 3.371 0.788 0.554 0.524 0.248 0.091
p¯d 0.000 1.960 0.816 0.735 0.246 0.078
p¯u + p¯d 3.371 2.748 1.370 1.259 0.494 0.169
g¯[d¯] 0.000 0.404 0.846 0.837 0.497 0.194
Total Exp. 3.371 3.371 3.371 3.371 3.371 3.371
question. Can we improve welfare in the long run by making a standard PAYG
pension system partially health-dependent? Result 2 provides the answer.
Result 2 In an economy with a partially health-dependent pension scheme, and given
assumption 1, lifetime steady state welfare levels are higher than in a purely PAYG
pension system.
In other words, even when an optimal combination of health tax and pension con-
tribution rates is politically infeasible -because of e.g. a psychological lower bound on
the levels of universal pension beneﬁts- introducing some health-dependent elements
still pays oﬀ. As the second column of table 3 points out, even setting a health tax
of 1% improves lifetime utility considerably. An eﬀect which holds out under higher
weights ρ on the universal pension beneﬁt as well.
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Table 3: Pure vs impure PAYG pension system: ρ = 0.75
Health Tax Rate τh
Variable payg τh = 1% τh = 5% τh = 8.1% τh = 10% τh = 12.5%
U¯ 3.332 3.370 3.429 3.436 3.434 3.426
k¯∗ 2.432 2.515 2.777 2.956 3.069 3.218
w¯ 21.402 21.693 22.571 23.147 23.490 23.940
c¯1 15.638 15.832 16.391 16.741 16.945 17.209
c¯2 18.352 18.206 17.760 17.467 17.294 17.069
c¯1 + c¯2 33.990 34.038 34.151 34.208 34.239 34.278
d¯ N/A 0.170 0.504 0.620 0.666 0.712
τˆp 15% 13.85% 9.46% 6.15% 4.14% 1.50%
h¯ 0.000 0.218 1.129 1.875 2.349 2.992
p¯u 3.371 2.365 1.682 1.122 0.766 0.284
p¯d 0.000 0.655 0.278 0.142 0.085 0.027
p¯u + p¯d 3.371 3.020 1.960 1.264 0.851 0.311
g¯[d¯] 0.000 0.133 0.282 0.232 0.171 0.068
Total Exp. 3.371 3.371 3.371 3.371 3.371 3.371
6 Concluding remarks
Better health not only boosts longevity in itself, it also postpones the initial onset
of disability and chronic inﬁrmity to a later age. Taking on the potential impacts
of such `compression of morbidity' on pensions, we introduced a health-dependent
dimension to the standard pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme studied in the liter-
ature. Studying the long-term implications of such a system in a simple overlapping
generations framework, we've shown under which conditions an increase in public
health investment can augment capital accumulation in the long run. Because of
this, the combination of health investment with a partially health-dependent PAYG
scheme may in fact outperform a purely PAYG system in terms of lifetime welfare,
and at identical levels of tax revenue.
Now, in a world where more than two out of ﬁve people aged 65 or older report
having some sort of functional limitation,22 these results matter. Indeed, the im-
portance of so called long-term care assistance has grown together with the number
of dependent elderly.23 Moreover, because of shifting family patterns -where women
enter the labour market rather than caring for older relatives- and a failing private
market,24 this challenge has come to lie with the public sector. Simply extrapolating
22These can range from sensory, physical, mental, or self-care disabilities, to diﬃculties leaving
home (see Pestieau and Ponthière (2010)).
23This kind of elderly care care can be administered both at home and in various kinds of insti-
tutions, including nursing homes and long-stay hospitals (Cremer et al., 2012).
24See e.g. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) on the insurance puzzle in the long term care private
insurance market, or Pestieau and Sato (2008) on the case for public nursing.
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on the basis of existing policies, public expenditures in the EU27 are already expected
to increase by 115 per cent on average in the coming 40 years.25
In most cases formal long-term care assistance is ﬁnanced on a PAYG basis, and
conditionally assigned using a disability scale identifying various levels of dependency
(e.g. the Katz scale). Our emphasis on health-dependent `disability' pensions then
seems justiﬁed, and can be seen as extending the standard PAYG pension beneﬁt with
a long-term care dimension. Moreover, as this kind of health-dependent beneﬁts are
projected to rise in the future, our model lays bare the importance of public health
investment. A budget neutral health investment not only improves health itself, but
also braces capital accumulation, wages, and consumption through the multiplier
eﬀect set in motion by the health-dependent pension scheme. This way, public health
investment keeps pensions sustainable in ways a simple contribution increase would
otherwise fail to do. Indeed, not only will overall welfare increase given the same tax
burden, pension liabilities will gradually erode over time the more we include health
status as a factor.
25Cremer et al. (2012) base their conjectures on the 2009 'Aging report' of the European Com-
mission, and underline that this projection does not capture the full scale of the policy challenge.
Future changes in the number of people receiving informal or no care (which depends on family
patterns) are expected to deteriorate, yet assumed constant in their analysis.
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Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
The proof is done in two steps. First, we prove that the trivial steady state k¯∗ = 0,
the zero equilibrium of the dynamic equation (12), is unstable. Deﬁne the right-
hand-side of equation (12) as Z[k]. Diﬀerentiating Z[k] with respect to k gives:
Z
′
k[k] =
α2βc1kα−1(1− τh − τp)
(
c12τ2hk
2α(α(β + 1) + (1− α)c3) + 2c1c2τhka + c2
)
(1 + n) (c2− c1τhkα(α(−β + c3− 1)− c3))2
with c1, c2 and c3 deﬁned in section 3.5 of the main text. Given that (c1, c2, c3) > 0,
we observe that Z
′
k[k] > 0 for any k > 0. Since Z(0) = 0 and limk→0+ Z
′
k(k) = +∞,
it follows that the steady state k¯∗ = 0 can never be stable.
Second, we prove that there exists an internal solution, k¯∗ > 0, which is a stable
steady state. Rewrite the dynamic equation (12) in steady state, k = Z[k], as:
Y1[k] ≡ k1−α = α(1 + c1k
α
t τh)(1− τh − τp)βc1
(1 + n)(c2− c1kαt τh(α(c3− 1− β)− c3))
≡ Y2[k]
Then observe that Y1[0] = 0, Y
′
1,k[k] = (1 − α)k−α > 0 for any k > 0, and that
limk→+∞ Y1[k] = +∞. Deﬁne Y2[0] = αc1(1−τh−τp)β(1+n)c2 , :
lim
k→+∞
Y2[k] =
αc1(1− τh − τp)β
(1 + n)(c3(1− α) + α(1 + β))
and
Y
′
2,k[k] =
α2βc12τhk
α−1(τh + τp − 1)(−c2 + α(β − c3 + 1) + c3)
(1 + n) (c2− c1τhkα(α(−β + c3− 1)− c3))2
Using c2 = α(1 + β) + τp(1 − α) and c3 = τp(1 − d1(1 − ρ)), we observe that
the denominator of Y
′
2,k[k] is always positive. The numerator can be written as:
(1 − α)α2c12d1kα−1τhτp(1 − τh − τp)β(1 − ρ). This expression is positive for any
k > 0, implying that Y
′
2,k[k] > 0. Moreover, notice that Y2(0) < limk→+∞ Y2[k]
when (1− α)d1τp(1− ρ) > 0. Given restrictions on parameters, the latter condition
is always veriﬁed. It follows that for any k > 0, Y1[k] = Y2[k] only once at k¯
∗ > 0,
characterising the asymptotically stable steady state. 
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Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 2
Deﬁne the relation between steady state of capital k¯ and health taxation τh as fol-
lows:26 G[k¯, τk] = k¯−Z[k¯, τh] with Z[k¯, τh] deﬁned as the right-hand-side of equation
(12) in steady state. We apply the implicit function theorem to derive the eﬀect of
health taxation, τh, on capital k¯:
k¯
′
τh
[τh] = −
∂G[k¯,τh]
∂τh
∂G[k¯,τh]
∂k¯
= −A
B
(22)
Where A in expression(22) denotes:
A = αβc1k¯α
(
c2
(
c1k¯α(2τh + τp − 1) + 1
)− c1k¯α(α(−β + c3− 1)− c3) (c1τ2h k¯α − τp + 1)) (23)
With c1, c2 and c3 deﬁned in section 3.5 of the main text. Similarly, B is equal to:
B = α2βc1k¯α−1(τh + τp − 1)
(
c12τ2h k¯
2α(α(β − c3 + 1) + c3) + 2c1c2τhk¯α + c2
)
+
+(1 + n)
(
c2− c1τhk¯α(α(−β + c3− 1)− c3)
)2
(24)
The derivative k¯
′
τh
[τh] is equal to zero when the numerator is equal to zero. Solving
in terms of τh, allows us to observe that the numerator is zero if τh = τ¯h, with:
τ¯h =
k¯−2α
(
c1c2k¯α ±
√
c12k¯2α(c2 + (c1(τp − 1)k¯α)(α(−β + c3− 1)− c3) (α(−β + c3− 1)− c3) + c2)
)
c12(α(−β + c3− 1)− c3)
Note that the denominator of the threshold τ¯h is always negative, so that τ¯h can
be positive only when the numerator is negative. Since the term below the square
root is positive and imaginary solutions are therefore ruled out, a positive threshold
τ¯h can be obtained by keeping the minus sign before the square root. In this case, the
threshold will be positive when: k¯ > k˜ ≡
(
τp+α(1−τp+β)
α(α−1)2d1(1−τp)τp(1−ρ)
) 1
α
. Moreover, τ¯h is
is also smaller than 1. To prove this statement, it is suﬃcient to observe that τ¯h < 1
when β > β˜. The latter condition is always veriﬁed since β > 0 by assumption and
β˜ ≡ k¯
−α(c1(α(c3−1)−c3)k¯α(c1k¯α−τp+1)−c2(c1(τp+1)k¯α+1))
αc1(c1k¯α−τp+1) < 0.
In order to prove that ∂k¯∂τh > 0 when τh < τ¯h, we have to consider the sign of the
numerator and denominator of k¯
′
τh
[τh], as expressed by (22). First, and after some
manipulation, the denominator in (22) is always positive for any k¯ > 0. Solving the
denominator in terms of k¯ we derive
˜˜
k ≡
(
− c2c1τh(c3(1−α)+α(1+β))
) 1
α
< 0. Notice that
the equation of the denominator crosses the x-axis once at
˜˜
k. Considering that at
k¯ = 0 the denominator of k¯
′
τh
[τh] reduces to (1 + n)c2
2, the equation is necessarily
increasing. It follows that the denominator is strictly increasing in k¯ and is always
positive under assumption 1. Thus, the sign of k¯
′
τh
[τh] will depend on the sign of the
numerator in (22).
26For simplicity, ∗ is omitted.
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Deﬁne for simplicity I[k¯] = c1k¯α and X = −c3 + α(c3 − 1 − β). Then, observe
that the numerator of k¯
′
τh
[τh] expressed by (22) is zero when the health tax rate
τh =
c2I[k¯]±
√
I[k¯]2(c2+X)(c2+(τp−1)XI[k¯])
XI[k¯]2
, that is when τh = τ¯h as deﬁned above. The
fact that two solutions exist, indicates that the numerator of equation k¯
′
τh
[τh] is a
parabola. Rewriting the numerator of (22) as follows:
αI[k¯](c2 + I[k¯]c2(2τh + τp − 1)− I[k¯](1 + I[k¯]τ2h − τp)X)β (25)
and deriving with respect to τh, we get:
2αI[k¯]2(c2 − τhXI[k¯])β
Since X < 0, the derivative is positive when τh > 0 and the critical point,
c2
XI[k¯
,
negative. Finally, observe that the second derivative, −2αXI[k¯]3β is always positive.
It follows that the critical point of equation (25) is a minimum and the branch of the
parabola in the domain τh > 0 always increasing, crossing the x-axis when τh = τ¯h.
As proved above only one of the two solutions of k¯
′
τh
[τh] = 0 can be positive (if
k¯ > k˜) and smaller than one. Then, in the domain τh > 0, the sign of the numerator
in (22) will be negative for any τh < τ¯h and positive otherwise. Since the sign of the
re-worked denominator in (22) was always positive, we observe that k¯
′
τh
[τh] = −<0>0
i.e. > 0 if τh < τ¯h and that k¯
′
τh
[τh] = −>0>0 i.e. < 0 if τh > τ¯h. 
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